Modi-fying Indian federalism? Centre-State Relations under Modi's tenure as Prime Minister by Sharma, Chanchal Kumar & Swenden, Wilfried
www.ssoar.info
Modi-fying Indian federalism? Centre-State
Relations under Modi's tenure as Prime Minister
Sharma, Chanchal Kumar; Swenden, Wilfried
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Sharma, C. K., & Swenden, W. (2018). Modi-fying Indian federalism? Centre-State Relations under Modi's tenure as
Prime Minister. Indian Politics & Policy, 1(1), 51-81. https://doi.org/10.18278/inpp.1.1.4
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-59853-1
51
Modi-fying Indian Federalism? 
Center–State Relations under 
Modi’s Tenure as Prime Minister 
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Abstract 
For the first time since 1984, the 2014 general elections handed a 
majority in the Lok Sabha to a single party. This article provides a 
critical assessment of what the victory of the Bharatiya Janata Par-
ty has meant for the dynamics of center–state relations in India. 
In doing so, the article first engages with the concept of “compet-
itive-cooperative federalism” and more widely with a framework 
that allows us to locate shifts in center–state relations across three 
dimensions: the political, the fiscal, and the administrative. Over-
all, we argue that despite the BJP’s promise to put “center-state re-
lations on an even keel” these relations have become more central-
ized under the Prime Ministership of Narendra Modi. At the same 
time, this process of centralization has not been uniform across the 
three identified dimensions: centralization is strongest in the polit-
ical domain, but weakest in fiscal matters, where the central gov-
ernment felt bound by the recommendations of the XIV Finance 
Commission and by longstanding intergovernmental discussions 
on overhauling India’s complex indirect taxation system with a pol-
ity-wide Goods and Services Tax, the management of which relies 
on center–state consent.
Keywords: federalism, multilevel governance, India, intergovern-
mental relations, decentralization, Modi.
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Resumen
Por la primera vez desde 1984, las elecciones generales de 2014 
asignaron una mayoría en el Lok Sabha a un solo partido. Este ar-
tículo proporciona una evaluación crítica de lo que la victoria del 
partido Janata Bharatiya ha significado para la dinámica de las re-
laciones centro-estado en India. Al hacer esto el artículo primero 
tiene que ver con el concepto de ‘federalismo competitivo-coope-
rativo’ y más ampliamente con un marco teórico que nos permite 
localizar cambios en las relaciones centro-estado en tres dimensio-
nes: la política, la fiscal y la administrativa. En conjunto, argumen-
tamos que a pesar de la promesa del BJP de poner ‘las relaciones 
centro-estado en un nivel más equitativo,’ estas relaciones se han 
vuelto más centralizadas bajo el mandato de Narendra Modi. Al 
mismo tiempo este proceso de centralización no ha sido uniforme 
en las tres dimensiones identificadas: la centralización es más fuer-
te en el dominio político, pero más débil en temas fiscales, donde el 
gobierno central se sintió obligado a seguir las recomendaciones de 
la XIV Comisión de Finanzas y de las antiguas discusiones intergu-
bernamentales para renovar el complejo sistema tributario indirec-
to con un Impuesto de Bienes y Servicios presente en las políticas: 
la gestión de este mismo yace en el consentimiento centro-estado.
Palabras clave: federalismo, gobernanza multi-nivel, India, rela-
ciones intergubernamentales, descentralización, Modi
摘要
2014年印度大选是自1984年来将人民院中的大多数席位交给
单一党派（的选举）。本文批判地评估了印度人民党获胜对
印度中央-地方关系动态意味着什么。为此，本文首先处理
了“竞争兼合作联邦制”的概念，然后广泛处理了一项框
架，该框架允许我们通过三个维度定位中央-地方关系的变
化。这三个维度分别关于政治、财政和行政。总体而言，本
文主张：尽管人民党承诺将中央-地方关系放在平等的位置，
但这些关系却在印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪的领导下变得越来
越中心化。与此同时，中心化过程在三个维度中却并不一
致：中心化在政治领域最为集中，在财政方面最为分散—第
十四届财政委员会提出的各种建议约束着中央政府，后者还
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要参与长期存在的政府间讨论。这些讨论则关于改革印度复
杂的间接税收制度，包括受政体影响的商品和服务税，此税
的管理需通过中央-地方政府的同意。
关键词：联邦制，多层治理，印度，政府间关系/府际关系，
去中心化，莫迪
Introduction: The 2014 
General Election Result and its 
Anticipated Effect on Center–
State Relations in India 
The general elections of 2014 re-stored de facto one-party gov-ernment at the Indian Center. 
After nearly two decades of (minority) 
coalition government, the Bhartiya Ja-
nata Party managed to capture a leg-
islative majority in the Lok Sabha on 
its own. Acknowledging that not all of 
these seats would have been won with-
out seat-sharing arrangements with 
regional allies, the BJP inducted some 
regional partners such as Shiv Sena 
(Maharashtra) in its (initial) cabinet. 
Even so, the 2014 elections appeared 
to mark a change in the Indian party 
system. The election results seemed to 
suggest that party competition was no 
longer structured along two “nodes” in 
which the BJP and Congress occupied 
the core of each node.1 Rather, with 
Congress reduced to just 44 seats, the 
BJP occupied a hegemonic position 
in the party system, potentially—as a 
set of assembly election results since 
2014 have shown—opening the way to 
one-party dominance. 
This article provides a first pre-
liminary assessment of what the impli-
cation of this change in government has 
meant for the dynamics of center–state 
relations in India. The decentraliza-
tion of the Indian federal polity since 
1989–1991 has often been attributed to 
two major developments. First, the en-
trenchment of (minority) coalition gov-
ernments which marked the post-Con-
gress Polity strengthened the position 
of the states. President’s Rule was used 
much less frequently and it was usual-
ly also sustained for shorter periods of 
time.2 The changing political circum-
stances also strengthened the Supreme 
Court in its resolve to police the use 
of President’s Rule more strictly as ev-
idenced since its Bommai judgment. 
This process of political decentraliza-
tion more or less coincided with the 
liberalization of the Indian economy, 
the second major development. Liber-
alization strengthened the states since 
it widened the opportunities for state 
governments to attract inward invest-
ment and manage their economic af-
fairs.3 Even so, the center retained an 
important regulatory role (to keep state 
budgetary deficits in check), and espe-
cially between 2004 and 2014 acceler-
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ated spending on social welfare with a 
view to reducing inter and intra-state 
disparities. 
There are compelling reasons to 
expect a significant centralization of 
Indian federalism post 2014. Given the 
factors which underpinned the strength-
ening of the states in the post-Congress 
period, the return of one party domi-
nance without the dependence on re-
gional or state-based parties to uphold 
a parliamentary majority strengthens 
the case for political centralization. Fur-
thermore, ideologically, the BJP is com-
mitted to cultural (Hindu) nationalism 
and this may further reduce the central 
government’s willingness to accommo-
date the ethnically distinctive North 
East and especially, Muslim-dominant 
Jammu and Kashmir. Finally, the in-
coming BJP Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi had been known to govern Guja-
rat in a highly centralizing way as Chief 
Minister of that state between 2001 and 
2014, and some political pundits expect-
ed him to pursue similar power-concen-
trating strategies in the governance of 
the Indian state.4 
At the same time, the second 
driver of decentralization—liberaliza-
tion—has remained intact. The BJP 
even sought to accelerate liberaliza-
tion.5 Therefore, some analysts predict-
ed more continuity than change in the 
nature of center–state relations. Unlike 
Congress, the BJP is also less concerned 
with the provision of a strong central 
welfare net to offset spatial and inter-
personal inequalities which liberal-
ization may provoke, thus potentially 
limiting the scope of federal redistribu-
tion. Furthermore, the long interlude 
of party fragmentation and central co-
alition government may have generated 
a path-dependent decentralizing effect 
which cannot be washed away so easi-
ly. For long, candidates and voters have 
paid more attention to local and state 
issues than to federal issues (even in 
general elections) and in this context, 
a stable return to center-based politics 
and campaigning would seem unlike-
ly. Also, at the time of the 2014 general 
elections, the BJP was not in control of 
most state governments and the Rajya 
Sabha. These institutions could be used 
as partisan and institutional veto players 
to curb any attempts at centralization. 
Finally, based on some declarations 
of Modi as former Chief Minister of 
Gujarat and a commitment to “co-op-
erative” federalism in the BJP 2014 
general election manifesto, Indian fed-
eralism would not necessarily central-
ize. Narendra Modi, during his tenure 
as the Gujarat chief minister, frequently 
lamented the excessive intrusion of the 
federal government in the exercise of 
state competencies, especially through 
the running of Centrally Sponsored 
Schemes (CSS).6 The BJP 2014 general 
election manifesto contained a pledge 
to put “Centre-State relations on an 
even keel through the process of con-
sultation” in which “national develop-
ment” would be “driven by the states.” 
In this “Team India,” a restructuring of 
intergovernmental relations was envis-
aged by projecting the creation of “Re-
gional Councils of States,” and the re-
vival or reconfiguration of “moribund 
forums” such as the National Develop-
ment Council and Inter-State Council’ 
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alongside a commitment to “ensure 
fiscal autonomy while urging finan-
cial discipline.”7 Those who predicted 
a state-favorable direction also point-
ed at the BJP’s pragmatic approach to 
seat-sharing or coalition building, facil-
itating the formation of coalitions with 
the Sikh nationalist Akali Dal in Punjab 
or the recent practice of electoral alli-
ances with the Tamil AIDMK or the As-
samese nativist Assam Gana Parishad. 
In this article, we argue that as 
expected by the first set of predictions 
above, center–state relations have be-
come more centralized since 2014. This 
is so, despite the BJP’s rhetoric of com-
petitive-co-operative federalism. At the 
same time, this process of centralization 
has not been uniform across three iden-
tified dimensions: the political, the fis-
cal, and the administrative. In fact, we 
find most support for political central-
ization, and least support for fiscal cen-
tralization, reflecting the outcome of de-
cisions by the Finance Commission and 
the impact of a long-planned wholesale 
reform of India’s indirect tax system. To 
illustrate our argument, the next section 
first brings clarity to how we conceptu-
alize change in center–state relations in 
India. Subsequently, we trace the trajec-
tory of center–state relations across the 
three aforementioned dimensions. 
Conceptualizing Center–
State Relations in a Time 
of Party System Change
We draw on the contribution of several scholars of feder-alism and institutional anal-
ysis to develop a conceptual framework 
within which to situate the evolution 
of center–state relations in India since 
2014. More in particular, we use the 
concepts of self-rule and shared rule 
to assess centralizing or decentralizing 
dynamics in the management of public 
policy between central and subnational 
regions (states) across three dimensions: 
the political, fiscal, and administrative.8 
The self-rule properties relate to poli-
cymaking autonomy (political dimen-
sion), subnational revenue autonomy 
(fiscal dimension), and the devolution 
of responsibility for planning, financing 
and delivery of public services (admin-
istrative dimension). The shared-rule 
properties along these three dimensions 
involve: participation in public policy-
making through common institutions; 
sharing of centralized tax revenues and 
joint responsibility for planning, fi-
nancing and delivery of public service. 
A process of centralization is marked 
by a reduction in self-rule properties of 
the states without a compensatory in-
crease in their shared-rule provisions. 
Where a reduction in self-rule is offset 
by increasing shared rule, interactions 
between both levels do not necessar-
ily become either more decentralized 
(states acquiring a stronger voice in how 
the center is run9) or more centralized 
(states agreeing to surrender certain 
powers to the central government in 
exchange for policy benefits and re-
sources10) but, rather, more interde-
pendent.11 Conversely, decentralization 
implies an increase in self-rule proper-
ties of the states. Thus, the trio of con-
cepts—centralization, decentralization, 
and interdependence—constitutes the 
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analytical core that can be applied to 
the study of center–state interactions in 
the three dimensions identified above. 
Interdependent policymaking may be 
pitted against independent policy- 
making which occurs when, in matters 
affecting other governments, a govern-
ment takes action without consulting 
other governments or considering their 
interests and those other governments 
may be forced to adjust independently.12
Since our paper focuses on cen-
ter–state interactions, we put particu-
lar emphasis on changes in the extent 
of shared rule across the three dimen-
sions. Where shared rule becomes more 
common, federalism moves into a co-
operative direction. Conversely, where 
shared rule is replaced with indepen-
dent and unilateral action by the cen-
ter, federalism moves into a centralizing 
or centripetal direction. Finally, when 
shared rule is replaced with unilateral 
action by state governments, federal-
ism acquires a more centrifugal form. 
The dictum “cooperative-competitive 
federalism” which the current Modi 
government proclaims assumes that in 
some policy domains the center and 
states are expected to move away from 
independent action and strengthen 
their collaboration through shared de-
cision-making in which each actor (the 
center and the states collectively) exer-
cises a mutual veto (powersharing). As 
we will see, the GST is the best, but also 
one of the few policy domains in which 
the principle of collaboration has been 
put into practice.
In the comparative literature, the 
term “competitive federalism” is gen-
erally understood to mean that states 
are given more autonomy to pursue 
their political, fiscal, and policy goals 
without interference of the center. The 
corollary of increasing autonomy is 
that states increasingly have to fend for 
themselves and face stronger account-
ability for their own actions. They also 
have to find a mix of tax policies and 
social services which suits their elector-
ate and retains their competitiveness in 
relation to other states within the feder-
ation. The assumed benefit of competi-
tive federalism is that it maximizes the 
role of the states as laboratories of de-
mocracy and policy experimentation. 
The logic of competitive federalism is 
inherently decentralizing. However, in 
India, the term “competitive federal-
ism” is often understood in a different 
sense, and in fact may not be “com-
petitive” at all. For instance, the Modi 
government has also used it to refer to 
the ability of the states to compete for 
central funding based on centrally—or 
at best, jointly (center and the states) 
determined goals and objectives. Un-
derstood accordingly, “competitive fed-
eralism” may generate a centralizing 
rather than a decentralizing dynamic. 
Similarly, the Indian government’s pol-
icy to promote competition amongst 
states to encourage foreign investment 
loses its decentralizing potential when 
the national ruling party attempts to se-
lectively promote investments in states 
under its rule and project them as the 
top places to do business.13 At this level 
of favouritism, “competition” becomes 
more of an exercise in “partisan federal-
ism” rather than genuinely “competitive 
federalism.”
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In this article, we make two key 
conceptual moves for explaining the 
emerging dynamics of center–state po-
litical, fiscal, and administrative rela-
tions in Modi’s India. First, we position 
center–state interactions (shared rule) 
along a centralization/decentralization 
continuum. Such an approach perfect-
ly suits India. Center–state relations 
have oscillated from extreme central-
ization under one-party dominance in 
the 1970s and 1980s, to a much more 
decentralized format in the 1990s and 
2000s under broad-based (minority) 
coalition governments at the center 
in which state-based parties played a 
key role. This prompted an observer 
to claim that India had moved from 
being “quasi-federal” in the former 
period to a “quasi-confederacy” in the 
latter period.14
Second, we analyze the nature 
and extent of shared rule along each 
of the three dimensions while being 
mindful of the overlap—especially the 
fact that political actors tend to interact 
across each of the dimensions simulta-
neously. Drawing on institutional theo-
ry15 and veto players theory,16 we con-
ceive of intergovernmental institutions 
as sites for interaction between institu-
tional-but-partisan veto players where 
conflict is always a possibility. This is 
important because, although institu-
tional veto players—such as state exec-
utives and parliaments, the federal cab-
inet or the Lok and Rajya Sabha—have 
different interests regarding the princi-
ples of federal organization and design 
of institutions,17 they can produce either 
cooperation or conflict, depending on 
their partisan affiliation. For instance, 
when a single party gains a majority in 
the Lok Sabha and controls all or most 
of the states, "intra-party" interaction 
takes place, making intergovernmental 
coordination easier. In this scenario, 
key institutional/partisan veto play-
ers—that is, national and subnational 
incumbents—belong to the same polit-
ical party. This can bring about cooper-
ative federalism, in spite of considerable 
political centralization: provided state 
or regional party branches have suffi-
cient autonomy,  shared policymaking is 
not an issue under these circumstances 
because regional units are incorporated 
into the central government’s decision 
procedures by virtue of their congruent 
party affiliation. We saw such a scenar-
io during the Nehru era in Indian pol-
itics (1952–1964/7). In contrast, strate-
gic powersharing and interdependent 
policymaking were at the highest level 
during the national coalition era in In-
dian politics (1996–2014), when state 
parties became pivotal players in the 
national legislature as either coalition 
partners or outside supporters. A third 
scenario can also occur, in which the 
national majority party faces stiff polit-
ical competition at the state level. This 
results in partisan polarization among 
states on the one hand, and a blending 
of cooperative and coercive tactics at 
the center (perhaps to deal with such 
polarization). A clear example of this 
was Indira Gandhi’s “punishment” re-
gime against opposition-ruled states. 
Modi’s government is facing this sce-
nario at present. Although the party has 
toppled the Congress in six states since 
2014, and as of January 2018 rules 19 
out of 29 states, its performance against 
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some of the state-based parties (notably 
in Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Bihar, and 
Delhi) has been considerably weaker. 
Furthermore, the party is likely to face 
strong competition from opposition 
parties in 2018 assembly elections, es-
pecially in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, 
and Chhattisgarh where anti-incum-
bency sentiment against the BJP runs 
high. 
On the shared rule dimension, 
India has fluctuated between extreme 
centralization and decentralization, 
based on the nature of the party constel-
lation at the center (one party dominant 
versus pluralized). This has affected the 
overall nature of Indian federalism, giv-
en that even during the coalition phase 
the center retained a dominant role in 
primary legislation and revenue ex-
traction and few constitutional amend-
ments were endorsed which strength-
ened the autonomy of the states. Indeed, 
based on a reading of the constitution, 
India’s federalism has always been rath-
er centralized, not unlike German or 
Australian federalism, rather than the 
much more decentralized Canadian or 
Swiss federations. In this “hybrid feder-
ation,”18 the significance of shared rule 
and self-rule is therefore all the more 
the result of partisan dynamics. How-
ever, under exceptional circumstances, 
a powersharing impulse in any given 
dimension may also emerge out of se-
vere limitations on national and subna-
tional governments’ abilities to follow 
independent policies. One example is 
the implementation of the GST, which 
attempts to achieve center–state tax 
harmonization, as we will discuss be-
low. Our conceptual understanding of 
centralization, decentralization, and in-
terdependence, especially in relation to 
shared rule equips us to trace the direc-
tion of change in center–state relations 
under Modi. We do so in relation to the 
political dimension first, followed by 
the fiscal and administrative.
Center–State Relations: 
The Political Dimension
The arrival of Modi as the Prime Minister of a government which no longer relied on support from 
regionalist parties concentrated powers 
at the center. Compared with Manmo-
han Singh’s Office, the Prime Minister’s 
Office gained in significance and within 
the BJP power has become increasing-
ly concentrated with Modi and Party 
President Amit Shah. Intra-party cen-
tralization has been exemplified by the 
role of the center in steering candidate 
nomination and campaigning in a range 
of assembly elections which have been 
held since the general elections in 2014. 
Election campaigns often centered on 
the Prime Minister, and Chief Ministe-
rial candidates were either announced 
late (as in the case of Kiran Bedi who 
was only announced as Chief Ministe-
rial candidate a couple of weeks before 
the Delhi legislative assembly elections 
in 2015) or not at all (as in the case of 
Uttar Pradesh in March 2017, with the 
designation of the controversial cleric 
Yogi Adityanath as Chief Minister after 
the state assembly elections).
Intra-party centralization does 
not necessarily generate political cen-
tralization within the wider polity. Yet, 
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there are indications of political “cen-
tering” across at least four fronts: (1) 
attempts to deploy President’s Rule for 
party political gain; (2) the unilateral 
nature of important decisions which 
impinge on center–state relations such 
as demonetization in 2016; (3) the in-
tention to forge simultaneous general 
and state elections; (4) the heavy-hand-
ed approach of the central government 
in relation to Jammu and Kashmir. We 
discuss each of these in turn. 
The Political Use of President’s Rule 
First, the ability of the BJP to deploy 
President’s Rule for political gain firstly 
assumes the appointment of partisan 
governors. In this sense, the BJP con-
tinued a longstanding practice of dis-
missing state governors who had been 
appointed by previous central govern-
ments of a different political persua-
sion. Shortly after it arrived into pow-
er, the BJP (by way of the President—a 
Congress politician nonetheless) oust-
ed nine governors who had been ap-
pointed by the previous Congress-led 
UPA government. Governors play a 
potentially important role during Pres-
ident’s Rule. Where a governor is of 
the opinion that “a breakdown of the 
constitutional machinery” occurs in 
the governance of the state, (s)he can 
recommend President’s Rule (resulting 
into direct central rule as per Article 
356 of the Indian constitution). The 
meaning of the “breakdown of insti-
tutional machinery” leaves room for 
interpretation and has been linked to 
insurgencies or political deadlock in 
the state. The latter may result from a 
government losing its majority in the 
state assembly, following defections 
or the breakdown of a state coalition 
government.19 Since Bommai (1994), 
the material on the basis of which 
President’s Rule is recommended is 
open to judicial review by the Indian 
Supreme Court. The BJP has sought 
to wield President’s Rule for party po-
litical gain on two occasions. In 2016, 
the party advised the imposition of 
President’s Rule on the governments of 
Arunachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand. 
In Arunachal Pradesh, factious in-
fighting within the Congress-led gov-
ernment propelled the BJP-appointed 
governor to advance the session of the 
state assembly by a month, making way 
for a BJP-led government. The starting 
point that led to President’s Rule in Ut-
tarakhand was similar: nine Congress 
MLAs broke away from the Party and 
the governor subsequently asked the 
Congress Chief Minister to prove his 
majority in the state assembly. How-
ever, unlike in the case of Arunachal 
Pradesh, not the governor but the cen-
tral government instructed the Presi-
dent to suspend the state government a 
day before the floor test was to be held. 
Importantly, on both occasions, the Su-
preme Court struck down President’s 
Rule. In the case of Arunachal Pradesh, 
the Supreme Court queried the justifi-
cation for bringing a planned meeting 
of the state assembly forward, leaving 
insufficient time for the Congress gov-
ernment to prove its majority on the 
floor. In the case of Uttarakhand, the 
Supreme Court dismissed the authori-
ty of the central government to impose 
President’s Rule before a floor test had 
taken place in the state assembly. The 
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Supreme Court also reinstated both 
Congress governments.20,21 In both cas-
es, the Supreme Court played its role 
as a potential safeguard of federalism 
(or institutional veto player) and solid-
ified the jurisprudence which it devel-
oped since its landmark Bommai judg-
ment in 1994. In fact, not before had 
the Court ordered the reinstatement of 
one, let alone two dismissed state gov-
ernments. 
Unilateral Decision-Making: 
The Case of Demonitization
The clearest example of unilateral de-
cision-making in policy terms was 
the shock decision of demonetization 
which resulted into the forced with-
drawal of 500 and 1,000 rupee notes 
as legal tender as of November 8, 2016 
and their replacement with new 1,000 
and 2000 rupee notes. This decision 
immediately depressed the economy, 
depleted the revenues of the state gov-
ernments22 and, in the process, violated 
both the spirit of democracy and that of 
cooperative federalism.23
The counter argument is that 
demonetization was meant to provide 
a shock—its onset had to be kept a se-
cret24—and that it was intended to in-
flict short-and medium-term pain to 
achieve some long-term gain, especially 
the rooting out of black money.25 How-
ever, several analysts have argued that 
the move was aimed at destroying po-
litical rivals, not black money.26 Most of 
the opposition Chief Ministers felt the 
same way. The then Chief Minister of 
Uttar Pradesh predicted that the move 
was politically motivated, with U.P. as-
sembly elections in sight.27 The election 
campaign and the results in March 2017 
seemed to prove him right.
The Pursuit of Concurrent General 
and State Assembly Elections 
The centralizing intent of the govern-
ment is also reflected in the central gov-
ernment’s expressed preference for si-
multaneous general and state elections. 
The idea was put forward in the BJP 
general election manifesto and further 
developed in a working paper by the 
NITI Aayog, the government’s think 
tank (see further).28 Earlier, the Law 
Commission of India in its 170th report 
on the Reform of Electoral Laws (1999) 
had already recommended such a re-
form. Furthermore, until 1967, general 
and state assembly elections coincided. 
This cycle was broken when in 1971 
Indira Gandhi brought forward gener-
al elections by a year as a means to as-
sert her authority within the party and 
demonstrate her electoral appeal vis-
à-vis a number of erstwhile state party 
leaders who had left the party.29 Uncou-
pling, in tandem with linguistic state 
reorganization helped to transform the 
states into territorial political commu-
nities in which turnout in state assem-
bly elections often exceeded electoral 
participation in general elections.30
The current government argues 
that simultaneous elections are desirable 
because the “Model Code of Conduct 
by the Election Commission” currently 
requires that when an election is called 
(state assembly or general) most devel-
opment programs in the state (includ-
ing welfare projects and capital proj-
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ects) are suspended until the election is 
complete. Usually, the suspension lasts 
between 2 (state assembly elections) 
and 4 months (general elections). The 
total number of months during which 
the Model Code of Conduct is applica-
ble across India can easily amount to 7 
months or more per year (for instance 
apart from general elections, 2014 also 
saw assembly elections in Haryana, 
Jharkhand, Jammu and Kashmir, and 
Maharashtra). Further arguments put 
forward to support simultaneity relate 
to the ability to optimize campaign and 
organizational costs as well as the secu-
rity costs involved in running elections.
Although the NITI Aayog paper 
by Debroy and Desai argues that simul-
taneous elections would not generate 
a centralizing impulse, this is not sup-
ported by comparative evidence. Across 
most parliamentary federal systems, 
general and subnational elections nor-
mally do not coincide. This is the case 
in Australia, Austria, Canada, and Ger-
many.31 Horizontal simultaneity (i.e. 
the concurrence of most or all regional 
elections), unlike vertical simultane-
ity (i.e. federal and all or most region-
al elections are held on the same day) 
applies to the quasi-federal systems of 
Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, and 
the federation of Belgium. Yet, region-
al elections in these (quasi-) federal 
states are often “second-order.” Turnout 
is generally lower than in general elec-
tions and voters tend to perceive these 
subnational elections as popularity 
tests for the incumbent central govern-
ment.32 Evidence from India also shows 
that when general and state assembly 
elections coincide, voters are much 
less likely to engage in split-ticket vot-
ing than when they are held separately. 
The assertion that they may well vote 
for similar state parties33 rather than for 
national parties is questionable given 
that the outcome of the 2014 general 
elections (one party majority) appears 
to have questioned the utility of a state 
party vote.34
The NITI working paper ac-
knowledges that synchronizing general 
and state assembly elections may have 
to be implemented in a phase-wise 
manner, and in the end the proposal 
settles for the concurrence of half of 
the state assembly elections and gener-
al elections and the other half at mid-
point between two general elections. 
Comparative evidence suggests that the 
anti-(central) incumbent vote is high-
est when state assembly elections take 
place at mid-point, whereas the out-
come of state assembly elections more 
likely approximates the national elec-
tion outcome the closer it is held to the 
nearest general election.35 As such, the 
proposal would nationalize the election 
campaign and outcome, though not 
necessarily strengthen the position of 
the incumbent central government. The 
ball is now in the court of the Election 
Commission which has been asked to 
study this proposal in more detail and 
suggest how it could be implemented.
The Accommodation of Ethno-
National Difference: The Case 
of Kashmir and Nagaland
Shortly after entering into power, the 
BJP’s willingness to tolerate special 
regional autonomy or constitutional 
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asymmetry on the basis of ethno-na-
tional or regional difference was se-
verely tested in the case of Jammu and 
Kashmir. Not unlike previous govern-
ments (especially Congress), the BJP 
adopted a centralizing approach. Schol-
ars of Kashmir often attribute the state’s 
disquiet to the high-handed manner in 
which Mrs. Gandhi centralized polit-
ical control of the state.36 This disquiet 
escalated into armed conflict in 1988 
after the rigged 1987 state elections,37 
giving way to a long period of human 
rights infringements, arrests of popu-
lar leaders, and the suppression of po-
litical dissent.38 It was at this juncture 
that Pakistani attempts to sow discord 
in Kashmir39—which largely failed un-
til 1989—began to bear fruit.40 Any at-
tempts to restore a lasting peace in this 
region, therefore, need to focus on con-
flict in Kashmir, not conflict over Kash-
mir. This, however, is a delicate task, 
given the intense sense of “victimhood” 
presently evident among residents of 
the Kashmir Valley.41
Despite its Hindu national-
ist credentials, the BJP Vajpayee-led 
NDA government sought to pursue a 
“healing touch” policy in consultation 
with the PDP (People’s Democratic 
Party)-led government in Jammu and 
Kashmir in 2003.42 This policy was 
based on the principles of “Insaniyat” 
(humanity or non-violence), “Kash-
miriyat” (the recognition of Kashmir 
as a distinctive, secular, and composite 
culture), and “Jamhooriyat” (democra-
cy) and was meant to make Jammu and 
Kashmir a model of “co-operative fede-
ralism.” However, this approach was left 
behind with the change of government 
at the center and the state since 2004. 
In March 2015—after lengthy negotia-
tions, consequent upon the hung house 
thrown up by the 2014 assembly elec-
tions—the PDP decided to forge a state 
coalition government with the BJP, de-
clining the unconditional support of-
fered by the National Conference (NC) 
and Congress. Yet both parties had can-
vassed on radically different platforms: 
the PDP on a demand for autonomy, not 
sovereignty, and the BJP on a “muscu-
lar” platform meant to court the Hindu 
majority vote in Jammu. In it, the BJP 
promised the abolition of Article 370 
(which grants special status to J&K) to 
facilitate greater integration of the state 
with India. However, in the “Agenda 
of Alliance,” the coalition reinstated its 
commitment to the Vajpayee-principles 
and promised to start a dialogue with 
political groups of various ideological 
persuasions, including the Hurriyat 
Conference, which supports self-de-
termination. The BJP also conceded to 
uphold Article 370 and committed to 
assess the need to continue the Armed 
Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in 
disturbed areas.43 
With time, however, it became 
clear that the BJP was not willing to 
shed its muscular electoral stance. The 
party demanded a ban on cow slaugh-
tering and the selling of beef in the 
Muslim-majority state. Modi also ruled 
out any discussion on the restoration 
of full autonomy, refused to bring the 
separatists to the negotiating table, and 
called off talks with Pakistan. Thus, al-
though there is no inherent contradic-
tion between wanting Kashmir to be 
part of the national mainstream and the 
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state's desire for autonomous self-gov-
ernance,44 the BJP’s stand is that these 
are incompatible goals. A period of in-
stability broke out following the death 
of Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad 
Sayeed, and especially after the killing 
of Burhan Wani, a young militant lead-
er of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen by Indian 
security forces in July 2016. The crack-
down on civilians attending the funeral 
of Burhan Wani escalated tensions fur-
ther. 
Scholarship on Kashmir has 
demonstrated that the gradual whit-
tling away of the state’s special status 
under Article 370 has contributed to 
fueling resentment against the Indian 
state.45 However, the BJP perceives Ar-
ticle 370 as the reason behind the Val-
ley’s increasing alienation and its lack 
of development. Most recently, the BJP 
has been condemned for not speaking 
out against a Public Interest Litigation 
which seeks to repeal Article 35A of 
the constitution—a provision that gives 
flesh to the special autonomy status as 
per Article 370.46 By not filing a counter 
affidavit in the Supreme Court to up-
hold article 35A, and rather seeking a 
"larger debate" on the issue, the BJP, so 
its opponents argue, implicitly supports 
its abolition. 
In a nutshell, by acting tough on 
Kashmir and making it a battleground 
for majoritarian nationalism,47 the BJP 
has sought to appease its core con-
stituency without due regard for the 
preferences among the inhabitants of 
the Valley in particular. Comparative 
scholarship on conflict management in 
(post)-conflict societies suggests that 
such an approach could destabilize the 
region even further.48 Kashmir’s border 
status next to a “hostile” neighbor and 
the Muslim-majority nature of the state 
in a secular, though increasingly Hindu 
majoritarian parent-state make accom-
modation already challenging to begin 
with. The decline in regional autonomy 
and in the capacity of regional actors to 
influence central policies in relation to 
the state (especially since the BJP cen-
tral government does not require the 
support of regional, let alone Kashmiri 
allies to uphold its central parliamen-
tary majority) is likely to intensify in-
tra-state and center–state conflict even 
further. The extent of disillusionment 
in Kashmir is evident from the very low 
turnout in two recent by-elections in 
Srinagar in April 2017 (as low as 2 per-
cent). This stands in sharp contrast with 
the 66 percent turnout figure in the 
2014 state legislative assembly election. 
However, a more optimistic and 
accommodative note can be struck 
in the case of Nagaland. The BJP gov-
ernment (building on negotiations 
which had started by the previous Con-
gress-led UPA government) signed a 
framework agreement with the Na-
tionalist Socialist Council of Naga-
land (Isaac-Muivah). In it, the NSCN 
(I-V) accepts the principle of shared 
sovereignty with India. In turn, Modi 
pledged to be partners of the Nagas in 
their “pride and prestige.” However, the 
framework simply opens up a dialogue 
between the Government of India and 
the Nagas, but does not result in mu-
tual engagements yet. Furthermore, 
factionalism among Naga groups and 
concerns by leaders of Assam, Mani-
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pur, and Arunchal Pradesh who fear a 
“greater Nagalim” and a militarist tradi-
tion among NSCN (IM) could weaken 
the significance of this agreement.49
 
Center–State Relations:  
The Fiscal Dimension
The Fourteenth Finance 
Commission (2015–2020): Towards 
a “Trust-Based” Paradigm of 
Center–State  Relations 
Growth-enhancing benefits of fiscal decentralization stem from both the synergistic com-
bination of independent revenue-rais-
ing authority at subnational level and 
a credible “no-bail-out” policy in the 
overall context of a common market.50 
However, in India there is less room for 
the assignment of independent reve-
nue-raising powers to subnational gov-
ernments51 and a credible no-bail-out 
policy is difficult to uphold.52 Therefore, 
a combination of an untied transfer sys-
tem, plus rule-based fiscal control to 
minimize moral hazards and common 
pool problems, serves as a second-best 
solution. This has been the approach of 
the Fourteenth Finance Commission 
while making recommendations for the 
period 2015–2020.
The Fourteenth Finance Com-
mission report details a new “trust-
based” paradigm of Center–state rela-
tions by (a) recommending a shift from 
tied transfers (schemes and grants) 
to untied transfer (devolution of tax 
share)-based support; (b) ending the 
plan-non-plan dichotomy; (c) includ-
ing a generous scheme to supplement 
the resources of local bodies; (d) recom-
mending a redesign of the Inter-State 
Council to cover state financial allo-
cations that supplement the statutory 
transfers recommended by the Finance 
Commission; (e) rejecting states’ de-
mands for special debt-relief packages 
and recommending a rule-based ap-
proach toward fiscal discipline instead; 
(f) removing the distinction between 
general and special category states; (g) 
recommending an independent fiscal 
council for monitoring fiscal rule com-
pliance; and (h) eliminating “fiscal dis-
cipline” as a condition for the horizon-
tal distribution of tax shares.
The decentralizing thrust of the 
Finance Commission report is reflect-
ed in its recommendation to increase 
the share of the states in the net pro-
ceeds of shared tax receipts from 32 
percent in the period between 2010 and 
1 to 42 percent for the period covering 
2015–2020. In doing so, the Commis-
sion sought to allow state governments 
greater autonomy and flexibility in de-
signing, financing, and implementing 
development programs. The cash flow 
that comes with this freedom to allocate 
resources is hoped to unleash healthy 
economic competition for better provi-
sion of public services,53 thereby limit-
ing subnational governments’ incentives 
to raid the fiscal commons. Politically, 
measures such as an enhanced share 
in the center’s net tax revenues, great-
er flexibility in the use of funds (even 
funds envisaged for disaster relief can 
be utilized on adversities which are not 
in the notified list of disasters), and cen-
tral grants-in-aid of Rs 48,906 crore to 
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11 revenue-deficit states, seem to have 
pacified states’ resentment for the loss 
of taxation powers and revenues under 
the GST regime (see below), the other 
major fiscal innovation since 2014.
The Fourteenth Finance Com-
mission also altered the key for the 
horizontal (inter-state) distribution 
of shared tax receipts. In comparison 
with previous Commissions, it omitted 
a “fiscal discipline index” (see Table 1 
below). Although in the view of some 
this was perceived as encouraging fis-
cal profligacy of the states54), the Com-
mission removed a significant source 
of perverse incentives for fiscal mis-
management by the states, namely the 
distinction between plan and non-plan 
revenues.55 This incentivized states to 
present estimates of deficits on non-
plan accounts to the Finance Com-
mission (which allocated grants on the 
basis of need) and surpluses on non-
plan accounts to the erstwhile Planning 
Commission (which allocated grants on 
the basis of state financial capacity).56 
To reverse these perverse incentives, 
the Fourteenth FC, in a significant de-
parture from earlier Finance Commis-
sions, included plan expenditures in its 
expenditure projections for states. Thus, 
the devolved share of states in the divis-
ible pool subsumes block grants given 
by the erstwhile Planning Commission. 
The biggest loser in this process are the 
special category states which so far re-
ceived generous treatment in terms of 
funds under Normal Central Assistance 
(NCA), Special Central Assistance 
(SCA), and Special Plan Assistance 
(SPA). In fact, the Fourteenth Finance 
Commission recommendation means 
that “special category states” (SCS) are, 
in effect, not special anymore. 
Table 1: A Comparative View of the Horizontal Devolution Formulae
Notes: Demographic change reflects population shifts between 1971 and 2011; The income dis-
tance is computed by calculating difference between 3-year average per capita GSDP for each state 
with respect to state with highest per capita GSDP; Area has a floor limit of 2 percent for smaller 
states in deciding horizontal devolution.
Variables Finance Commissions
XIth XIIth XIIIth XIVth
Population (1971) 10 25 25 17.5
Demographic change (2011) 0 0 0 10
Income (Distance Method) 62.5 50 47.5 50
Area 7.5 10 10 15
Tax Effort 5 7.5 0 0
Index of Infrastructure 7.5 0 0 0
Forest Cover 0 0 0 7.5
Fiscal Discipline Index 7.5 7.5 17.5 0
Total 100 100 100 100
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On the other hand, the FC has 
adopted an approach that seeks to pro-
vide funds on a more economically ra-
tional basis. In addition to recommend-
ing an increase of 10 percent in the 
share of all states in the divisible pool, 
the Commission has factored in back-
wardness and forest cover in its devolu-
tion formula, both of which will benefit 
SCS. Furthermore, the commission has 
recommended post-devolution revenue 
deficit grants for 11 states without mak-
ing any distinction based on general or 
special category status. All this will help 
backward SCS, without discriminating 
against backward “general category” 
states. Notably, under the FC exercise, all 
special category states except Arunachal 
and Sikkim have qualified for the deficit 
grants. In addition, three general-catego-
ry states—namely, West Bengal, Kerala, 
and Andhra Pradesh—will also benefit. 
The Modi government accept-
ed the recommendations of the Four-
teenth Finance Commission on Febru-
ary 24, 2015. However, an implication 
of the new scheme (argued by the 
Prime Minister himself in his widely 
publicized letter to the Chief Ministers) 
is that such greater devolution will cor-
respondingly reduce the fiscal space for 
the center. 57 The actual effect, however, 
is somewhat different. In fact, the reve-
nue forgone due to higher devolution to 
the states is offset by the revenue saved 
from delinking or dropping 39 Central-
ly Sponsored Schemes (CSS) from cen-
tral support and reducing the contrib-
uting share of the center in 24 CSS from 
90–80 percent to 50–60 percent. So, the 
increase in total transfers to the states 
is marginal (Table 2, Col.6 and Figure 
1). In view of the Finance Commis-
sion’s recommendation to double and 
triple the flow of resources to rural and 
urban local bodies, the Modi govern-
ment also slashed the budget allocated 
to the union ministry of Panchayati Raj 
by about 97.19 percent—from Rs 3,390 
crore in 2014–2015 to a meager Rs 208 
crore in 2015–2016. It did so because 
the recommendation for local bodies 
gives states (PRI fall under the authori-
ty of the states) huge funds to empower 
panchayati raj institutions.
Yet, the commission’s devolu-
tion scheme has brought about a quali-
tative shift in terms of the composition 
of transfers by increasing the “decen-
tralizing” component (untied transfers 
through tax devolution) in total trans-
fers and minimizing the “centralizing” 
components (non-statutory grants58). 
The share of statutory grants (given 
under Art 275) which fall somewhere 
between these two poles—which was 
already low59—has increased only mar-
ginally (Table 2). With the implemen-
tation of the FFC recommendations, 
the center’s ability to employ discre-
tionary grants as an instrument of in-
fluencing states’ spending priorities or 
patronizing politically important states 
has shrunk significantly. Recall how, in 
August 2015, ahead of the Bihar state 
assembly elections, Modi surprised 
everyone by unilaterally announcing 
Rs 125,000 crore largesse for the state 
(without prior notification to the Bi-
har government to prevent them from 
claiming any credit in the future). Need-
less to say, the Center could not fulfill 
this promise.60 As can be seen from Ta-
ble 2 in the financial year 2015–2016, 
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i.e. immediately after the FFC recom-
mendations came into effect, the share 
of non-statutory grants in net resources 
transferred to states has declined by al-
most 15 percent (Table 2, Col. 3).
Table 2: States Share of Tax Devolution and Grants
Source: Budget Documents, Government of India.
Note: The practice of giving a portion of central assistance directly to implementing agencies, by 
passing the states, was reversed in 2014–2015, on the recommendations of the Expert Committee 
on Efficient Management of Government Expenditures, chaired by C Rangarajan. Thus, in order 
to ensure comparability, we have included direct release of central assistance to state implementing 
agencies while calculating non-statutory grants and net transfers prior to 2014.
Figure 1: Central Transfers to States (as Percent of Center’s Gross Tax Revenue) 
Percent of Total Transfers Percent of Center’s Gross  
Tax Revenue
Year Tax  
Devolution
Statutory 
Grants
Non- 
Statutory 
Grants
Tax  
Devolution
Total 
Grants
Total 
Transfers 
1 2 3 4 5 6
2009–2010 40.96 11.42 46.98 26.39 37.63 64.44
2010–2011 43.75 9.93 45.90 27.65 35.29 63.20
2011–2012 46.45 9.55 44.12 28.17 32.56 60.66
2012–2013 49.82 8.20 41.21 28.14 27.90 56.48
2013–2014 50.13 9.54 40.17 27.95 27.71 55.74
2014–2015 50.03 11.42 38.34 27.14 26.99 54.24
2015–2016 60.66 10.14 23.37 34.77 19.21 57.33
2016–2017 
(RE)
61.39 10.01 20.33 35.70 17.64 58.14
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Accepting and implementing 
core Finance Commission recommen-
dations on how taxes collected by the 
central government are to be shared 
with, and distributed among states 
has become an established convention 
in Indian politics. However, in view 
of the higher magnitude of the states’ 
shares in the divisible pool, the central 
government has increased those levies 
that it is not required to share with the 
states—namely, cesses, surcharges, and 
additional/special duties. The share of 
these special levies in the Central Gov-
ernment’s gross tax revenue increased 
from 8.8 percent in 2012–2013 to 15.2 
percent in 2016-17. State governments 
see this as a violation of the spirit of 
cooperative federalism, as it is clearly 
intended to deny them a share in addi-
tional revenues mobilized by the center. 
Interestingly, the GST Council, in its 
meeting held in September 2016, de-
cided that all existing cesses would be 
subsumed under the GST. The need to 
cooperate with the states to roll out a 
GST (from July 1, 2017) ensured that 
the cabinet cleared abolition of cesses 
in March 2017 leading to an increase in 
the size of the divisible pool of resourc-
es to the states’ advantage.
India’s Dual GST—Toward 
Economic Union in a Federal System 
Unlike several unilateral decisions such 
as demonetization, the announcement 
of intergovernmental grants in election 
rallies and the abolition of the Planning 
Commission, the implementation of 
the GST required persuasion, collab-
oration, and the consent of the states, 
not just numbers in the Lok Sabha. The 
passage of the Goods and Services Tax 
Act is a landmark, the most ambitious 
consumption-tax reform attempted so 
far involving center–state relations. The 
objective is to develop a harmonized 
national market while preserving the 
states’ fiscal autonomy. If implement-
ed properly, it promises to (a) make 
India one common economic market 
(by harmonizing all state and federal 
indirect taxes and removing inter-state 
tariff barriers)61 (b) reduce compliance 
cost and litigation (through a simplified 
GST structure with built-in checks on 
business transactions through a seam-
less credit mechanism)62 (c) make Indi-
an industry internationally competitive 
(by removing the cascading effect of 
taxes, thereby reducing the overall cost 
of indigenous products and services); 
and, finally, (d) accelerate economic 
growth (by reducing red tape-ism and 
distortions to the economy, promot-
ing ease of doing business).63 The key 
to the benefits of a GST regime lies in 
its broad-based low-rate and mini-
mum-rate differentiation.64 In light of 
this general description, we take a brief 
look at the Indian model of GST and 
what it means for center–state relations.
Although GST reform is con-
sidered a major step toward fiscal cen-
tralization, the very process which led 
to the implementation of the new GST 
regime was highly “federalizing,” i.e. 
strengthened the shared rule dimension 
of fiscal federalism65 Thus, the first ele-
ment of federalism in the current GST 
regime (since July 2017) lies in the fact 
that the center and the states have en-
tered into a grand bargain, after intense 
consultations,66 to achieve the common 
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goal of unifying fragmented markets. In 
the unified structure of GST, the central 
government pools its sovereignty over 
excise, service tax, additional duties, 
central surcharges, and cesses, while 
states pool their sovereignty over state 
VAT, luxury tax, entry tax, entertain-
ment and advertising taxes, and state 
surcharges and cesses. 
The second “federalizing ele-
ment” lies in the adoption of a “Con-
current Dual GST” model, with a des-
tination principle for cross-border 
trading (101st Constitutional Amend-
ment Act, 2016). In this model, gener-
ally endorsed by the experts,67 the Cen-
ter and the States will simultaneously 
levy Central GST (CGST) and State 
GST (SGST), respectively, on a com-
mon base. In addition, the center would 
have exclusive power to levy integrated 
GST (IGST) on all inter-State supply 
of goods and services. The destination 
(consuming or importing) states then 
get their share of IGST. This is a con-
siderable improvement on the previous 
“origin-based” taxation system, one 
that essentially exported the tax burden 
from more affluent, producing states to 
poorer, consuming states, contributing 
to horizontal fiscal inequality.68
However, this GST has its crit-
ics as well, despite its many positive el-
ements and federal compatibility. Some 
say that it is an imperfect and inefficient 
model because, conventionally, the sin-
gle GST (national GST) is considered as 
an ideal form of GST. But exploring this 
notion further, it becomes clear that 
the problem lies not in the dual struc-
ture of taxation—unavoidable in Indi-
an circumstances—but in the presence 
of multiple rates, with exceptions (zero 
rate) on the one end and very high rates 
on the other end.69 Theoretically, the 
GST, being an indirect tax, cannot be 
employed as a progressive tax—that is, 
with a higher tax on goods and services 
consumed by the rich and lower taxes 
on the items of mass consumption. This 
approach can be applied to direct taxes: 
the higher the taxable income, the high-
er the tax bracket. But India has adopt-
ed this approach for implementing the 
GST. So, in the Indian model of GST, 
there is a multilayered rate structure: 0 
percent, 5 percent, 12 percent, 18 per-
cent, and 28 percent. In addition, states 
are allowed to exercise some level of 
discretion as well. This is in stark depar-
ture from general international practice 
and can lead to artificial barriers to 
trade and commerce, something that 
the GST reform is meant to remove.70 
Furthermore, a higher GST rate negates 
what the GST stands for—that is, a low 
indirect -tax regime.71 Yet, this multilay-
ered rate structure has emerged from a 
consensus in the GST Council (GSTC) 
in which the central government’s vote 
is worth a third of the total, while votes 
of all the state governments put togeth-
er account for two-thirds. Any measure 
requires a three-fourths majority to be 
passed. Therefore, the GST Council is 
the third and the most important “fed-
eral feature” of the dual-GST regime, in 
which both levels of government have 
agreed to pool their sovereignty for a 
mutually shared goal. Although in the-
ory the states are not bound to accept 
recommendations of the GST Coun-
cil, it appears that all the stakeholders 
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understand that encouraging states to 
go their own way would simply lead to 
the unravelling of the GST. The voting 
structure on the GST council is such 
that the states collectively can block the 
Center’s proposal—if at least 12 states 
join hands. For the Center to get its pro-
posal cleared by the council, it will need 
the support of at least 19 states. Howev-
er, the centralizing element in this oth-
erwise cooperative federal institution is 
that the center can single-handedly veto 
any proposal put forth by the states.72 In 
the event of any dispute between the 
central government and the states or 
between the states arising out of the 
council’s recommendations or imple-
mentation thereof, the GST Council is 
empowered to establish a mechanism 
to adjudicate said dispute.
Center–State Relations and 
Intergovernmental Relations: 
The Administrative Dimension
In his first address to the nation on India Day since becoming Prime Minister (August 15, 2014), Modi 
announced his intention to scrap the 
Planning Commission and replace it 
with a new institution. The departure 
from centralized planning would free to 
states to develop more policy initiatives 
of their own and the new institution 
would merely seek to coordinate center–
state interactions whenever states im-
plement policies which are part-funded 
by the center. States would no longer re-
quire the consent of the center for their 
approval of their “annual plans” and the 
replacement of the Planning Commis-
sion would no longer steer the flow of 
(a large component) of central discre-
tionary grants to the states (see above). 
Although the Planning Com-
mission appeared to have lost some of 
its relevance in the increasingly mar-
ketized Indian economy, some scholars 
have argued that liberalization increased 
the significance of the Commission 
as a “lobby for development by public 
investment.”73 In this way, the Com-
mission had come to play a key role in 
overseeing, in tandem with the relevant 
line ministries, important social devel-
opment and infrastructure programs 
with the aim of reducing poverty and 
inter-state inequalities. Indeed, central 
investment in social services had in-
creased dramatically from 16 percent in 
the final plan before liberalization (Sev-
enth Five Year Plan, 1985–1990) to 30.2 
percent in the Eleventh Five Year Plan 
(2007–2012). Usually, these schemes 
took the form of “Centrally Sponsored 
Schemes” (CSS), the most prominent of 
which is the Mahatma Gandhi National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Act; in-
troduced by the Congress-led UPA gov-
ernment in 2005. 
However, in spite of the Com-
mission’s role in welfare74 the Planning 
Commission had been criticized for the 
centralizing way in which it pursued its 
objectives. This was exacerbated by the 
lack of shared rule provisions in the dai-
ly operation of the Commission. State 
chief ministers, the federal Prime Min-
ister and key members of the cabinet 
plus the members of the Commission 
were represented in the National Devel-
opment Council, but this body did not 
normally convene more than once per 
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year and had little input in the develop-
ment of the annual let alone Five-Year 
economic plans. The NDC served to air 
(and document, since its meetings were 
annotated) state grievances and aspira-
tions. The need for adequate state input 
during early stages of the policy cycle 
became apparent with the growing role 
of discretionary, nonformulaic-driven 
grants to the states which were seen to 
undermine federalism or state auton-
omy in a number of ways.75 Especially 
affluent states expressed a desire for a 
reduction in the number of Central-
ly Sponsored Schemes and lamented a 
lack of flexibility in their deployment; 
forcing them to spend money in ar-
eas in which they had no need.76 CSS 
were also seen to interfere and some-
times contradict state social policies 
and could operate as “unfunded man-
dates,” especially where the matching 
contribution of the center progressively 
decreased. Finally, CSS were perceived 
to have a regressive effect since their 
per capita uptake was often dispropor-
tionally lower in states with the high-
est needs. Given the matching nature 
of CSS, poorer states often lacked the 
resources or infrastructural capacity 
more generally to implement these pro-
grams.77
The replacement of the Plan-
ning Commission with the NITI Aayog 
in January 2015 was meant to increase 
the input of the states in intergovern-
mental policymaking and bring India 
closer to a model of “co-operative” (lat-
er rephrased as “competitive-co-opera-
tive”) federalism. Yet, the NITI primar-
ily serves as a think thank attached to 
the Office of the federal Prime Minister. 
Its internal structure makes more space 
for contractual staff and outside—of-
ten more junior—experts,78 but there 
is no evidence of a more direct link 
with the state administrations. It has a 
CEO, a vice-chairperson, a number of 
full-time members, ex-officio members 
(mainly federal cabinet members), and 
special invitees (So far, none of these 
have been state office holders). At the 
apex level, the National Development 
Council has been replaced with a Gov-
erning Council (which has met thrice 
between January 2015 and October 
2017); though full minutes of its meet-
ings are no longer available (summaries 
can be consulted on the website of the 
NITI). Governing Council meetings 
have been criticized as seeking to fur-
ther the national government’s policy 
objectives. For instance, the July 2015 
meeting was partially devoted to Land 
Acquisition, given that the federal gov-
ernment had run into trouble amend-
ing the Land Acquisition Rehabilitation 
and Resettlement Act (2013) in the 
Rajya Sabha (federal second chamber) 
where it does not hold a majority. The 
amendment of LARR was seen as nec-
essary to facilitate the development of 
land for business purposes. In the Gov-
erning Council, chief ministers of BJP- 
controlled states considered ways in 
which a federal executive ordinance in 
lieu of the amended bill could increase 
the role of the states in passing their 
own laws on land acquisition instead.79 
That this issue was put on the agenda 
raised concerns among (non-BJP/NDA- 
controlled states), especially since delib-
erations took place when a Joint Parlia- 
mentary Committee was still seeking to 
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debate a compromise solution. Conse-
quently, more than 10 chief ministers 
representing states run by federal oppo-
sition parties boycotted the Governing 
Council meeting.80
Apart from the Governing 
Council, a potentially more relevant 
contribution in terms of strengthening 
“co-operative federalism” can be made 
by so-called Regional Councils. These 
are composed of groups of chief min-
isters and have the potential to upload 
state policy preferences on issues which 
require center–state coordination at an 
early stage in the policy cycle. Howev-
er, the central executive has a preroga-
tive in determining the composition of 
Regional Councils and the themes on 
which such groups of chief ministers 
will focus. States may flag issues which, 
in their view require further discussion, 
but the Prime Minister’s Office subse-
quently selects those themes requiring 
further elaboration from a long -list.81 
On this basis, Regional Councils on 
skills development, Swach Bharat Abi-
yan (Clean India), and the restructur-
ing of Centrally Sponsored Schemes 
have been set up since 2015 and sub-
mitted their reports later that year. Each 
of these Regional Councils has been 
heterogeneous in party political com-
position, but all three have been chaired 
by—then NDA chief ministers (Andhra 
Pradesh, Punjab, and Madhya Pradesh), 
even though the intention was for two 
to be chaired by opposition chief min-
isters (Congress and CPI).82 Of all three 
Regional Councils, the Council con-
sidering the restructuring of Centrally 
Sponsored Schemes has been the most 
significant. Its report has been accepted 
by the federal government.83 The report 
advised the division of CSS into core 
and optional schemes. The former are 
welfare schemes which the government 
considers vital to its implementation of 
the National Development Agenda, and 
consists among others of MGNREGA 
and a number of additional schemes for 
Social Inclusion. The center contributes 
100 percent of core scheme funding for 
union territories, 90 percent for what 
used to be “special category states” (8 
North Eastern and Himalayan states) 
and 60 percent for other states. Option-
al schemes are allocated to the states by 
the Ministry of Finance on the basis of 
a lump sum from which the states are 
then free to choose which schemes they 
wish to implement. The contributing 
share of the center in these schemes 
is slightly lower compared with core 
schemes (except for union territories): 
80 percent in the case of the “special 
category states” and 50 percent for oth-
er states. Unlike the Planning Commis-
sion, the NITI lost its prerogative in 
making Scheme-wise allocations and in 
determining the inter-state distribution 
of these discretionary grants, although 
the “NITI in consultation with state 
governments and central ministries” 
would advise the Ministry of Finance 
on this matter.84 
Bringing the “competitive” ele-
ment into federalism, the NITI also en-
visages awarding smaller projects (such 
as funding for smart cities, or projects 
to improve schooling outcomes) on the 
basis of a competitive bidding process. It 
plans to do the same for projects in the 
health sector. For instance, in December 
2017, the NITI signed a Memorandum 
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of Understanding with the state govern-
ments of Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, and 
Jharkhand to assist these states in bet-
tering their educational performance. 
With the assistance of the NITI and a US 
consultancy, pilot projects within each 
state are meant to enhance education 
governance and outputs, which, when 
completed, should provide a model for 
other states to emulate.85 Yet, schemes 
like these do not necessarily produce 
“competitive-co-operative” federalism. 
Rather, they may engender a degree of 
centralization since the federal govern-
ment puts forward the stated goals and 
objectives on the basis of which states 
can bid for project assistance. Beyond 
the capacity to allocate smaller selective 
grants, the NITI has lost most of the in-
dependent grant-making powers which 
the Planning Commission had. Instead, 
it serves mainly as a repository of state 
practices across a range of policies 
(“sharing best practices”), but its power 
in these matters is merely advisory. 
There is then an interesting 
paradox which emerges based on the 
analysis of fiscal federalism and chang-
es in the working of the central gov-
ernment as set out above. Increased 
state financial devolution led to the 
partial retrenchment of the center from 
co-funding intergovernmental (wel-
fare) programs (potentially strength-
ening self-rule). However, this process 
coincides with a rise in authority of the 
PMO and Ministry of Finance in rela-
tion to the NITI Aayog in comparison 
with the Planning Commission before, 
weakening the (selective) voice of state 
actors in the design of intergovernmen-
tal programs part-funded by the cen-
ter. Furthermore, by seeking to replace 
in-kind subsidy payments with “direct 
benefit transfers” in the disbursement 
of these schemes on the ground, the 
BJP government not only aims to avoid 
“leakage” in their implementation, but 
also enhances the ability of the center to 
take full credit for such schemes; thus, 
strengthening its centralizing narra-
tive.86 
Finally, in convening a meet-
ing of the Inter-State Council in July 
2016, Modi, for the first time in a de-
cade, reactivated what constitutional-
ly is envisaged as India’s seminal apex 
intergovernmental body.87 The meeting 
brought together the Prime Minister, 
key union ministers and all state chief 
ministers to discuss key findings of a 
Commission on the Reform of Center–
State Relations which reported as long 
back as 2010. It also debated center–
state cooperation in the further rolling 
out of Aadhaar (unique identification 
scheme) and “direct benefit transfers” 
(necessitating Aadhaar). Education, 
security, and police reforms were also 
discussed. Although not insignificant 
as a symbolic gesture to affirm “co-op-
erative” federalism, the abolition of the 
Planning Commission could have pro-
vided an opportunity to reinvigorate the 
Inter-State Council as an intergovern-
mental body of genuine significance. 
In the view of Amitabh Pande, a retired 
secretary of the Inter-State Council, the 
NDC and ISC could have merged and 
some experts could have been moved 
from the Planning Commission to the 
ISC. For such a revamped ISC to play 
a genuinely intergovernmental role, the 
ISC would also have to be placed on the 
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same footing as the statutory Election 
Commission; unlike the NITI and ISC 
which are currently subsumed under 
the Prime Minister’s Office and Home 
Office, respectively.88 As such, recon-
vening the ISC, without modifying its 
remit and organizational structure, 
does not really strengthen the shared 
rule attributes of Indian federalism. 
Conclusion: Center–State 
Relations at a Critical Juncture? 
In this contribution, we provided a first and preliminary analysis of the dynamics of Indian federalism un-
der Modi. We focused primarily on the 
nature and outcome of inter-state rela-
tions, and thus emphasized the shared 
rule attributes of Indian federalism. 
The extent to which center–state inter-
dependence is genuinely met by cen-
ter–state cooperation or “shared rule” 
is important, especially since the Indian 
federal system attributes most legisla-
tive powers to the center, but relies on 
the states for their implementation. In 
the era of coalition government (1996–
2014), this co-operation was at least 
partially realized through the partici-
pation of a large group of state parties 
in central government. With the return 
to a single party parliamentary majori-
ty after the 2014 general elections, the 
strengthening of shared rule could still 
result from an ideological commitment 
to expand cooperative modes of deci-
sion-making, but it is no longer built 
in the modus operandi of the central 
government. In light thereof, it is not 
unexpected that we find considerable 
evidence for centralization since the 
2014 general elections. However, as our 
article shows, the push toward central-
ization is most apparent in political af-
fairs (as evidenced by the attempted ap-
plication of President’s Rule, the shock 
decision of demonetization, the debate 
on shifting to concurrent state and/or 
general elections, and the centralized 
and heavy-handed approach in relation 
to Kashmir).
We would argue that the same 
trend toward centralization marks the 
administrative sphere. Programs which 
the states implement on the basis of 
federal legislation do not necessari-
ly result from more shared rule input. 
Regional Councils within the NITI 
Aayog enable the states to participate 
in central or shared policies which the 
states implement during a much earlier 
stage in the policy-cycle, but based on 
current evidence they do not appear 
to have made decision-making more 
“shared” or “interdependent.” This is so 
especially when the federal government 
sets the agenda of the NITI, determines 
who chairs the Regional Councils, and 
in theory is free to adopt the NITI’s re-
ports as it sees fit. Central ministries or 
the NITI also determine on what terms 
states can “compete” for federal assis-
tance in certain schemes, thus provid-
ing further evidence of centralization, 
rather than “competition.” We should 
also note that the NITI’s weakness of 
grant-making powers in comparison 
with the Ministry of Finance may lead 
to further centralization. A centralizing 
effect also emanates from the prolifer-
ation of direct benefit transfers (in lieu 
of in-kind subsidy payments), which 
not only standardize but also centralize 
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service delivery since the technologi-
cal skills required to put such schemes 
into practice (Aadhaar) are not equal-
ly shared between the center and the 
states. 
Centralization tendencies are 
least apparent in the fiscal domain, 
where the current government has been 
bound by the decentralizing intent of 
the Fourteenth Finance Commission 
and continued the path toward the har-
monization of India’s indirect tax re-
gime on the basis of increasing center–
state cooperation. Importantly, “fiscal” 
decentralization or interdependence 
has been brought about not by the BJP 
government, but by a statutory expert 
commission and through the constitu-
tional imperative to work with the states 
in forging a new indirect tax regime.
Another BJP single party ma-
jority in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, 
and—based on successive wins in state 
assembly elections—a BJP majority in 
the Rajya Sabha and the (co)-gover-
nance of even more than the current 
(January 2018) 19 Indian states could 
lift the constitutional impediments to 
further centralization. Conversely, fi-
nancial decentralization has provided 
state governments with some space to 
develop their own track record. Espe-
cially non-BJP-ruled states could use 
this to build a counter-narrative for 
bucking the trend of political (and) ad-
ministrative centralization. Time will 
tell which way the pendulum will swing 
at this critical juncture in the trajectory 
of Indian center–state relations. 
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